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Abstract This paper takes part in the ongoing debate on how emotions can be
dealt with by argumentation theory. Its main goal is to formulate a relationship
between emotion and argumentation which differs from that usually found in most
of the literature on the subject. In the ‘‘standard’’ conception, emotions are seen as
the objects of appeals which function as adjuvants to argumentation: speakers
appeal to pity, fear, shame and the like in order to enhance the cogency of an
argument which bears on something else—whether it be the validity of a disputable
opinion or the opportunity of a course of action. According to the ‘‘alternative’’
conception which I propose to consider, emotions themselves may be viewed, in
some cases, as the very objects of argumentation. This conception lays emphasis on
the arguability of emotions. Drawing on insights from current psychological and
philosophical theories, it involves a reassessment of the Aristotelian concept of
pathos, as well as an in-depth critical discussion of normative and descriptive
approaches to emotional appeals.
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While it has long been adequate to label emotion as the ‘‘poor relation’’ of
argumentation studies, an overall view of the current state of the field suggests that
the situation is undergoing rapid change. Indeed, for the past fifteen years, emotion
has progressively been constituted as a legitimate object of research by several
argumentation theorists. What is remarkable, in this respect, is that this growing
interest for emotion crosses the boundary between normative and descriptive
approaches to argumentation. From a normative point of view, the analyst’s tasks
include an evaluation of arguments’ merits: what is at stake is to identify criteria
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which allow to distinguish between ‘‘reasonable’’ and ‘‘fallacious’’ uses of argument
(whether these criteria pertain to logico-deductive validity and/or to pragmatic
appropriateness). Following this line of thought, scholars have discussed emotional
appeals within the framework of a pragmatic theory of fallacies (Walton 1992,
1997, 2000) and, more recently, within that of ‘‘normative pragmatics’’ (Manolescu
2006). From a descriptive point of view, the analyst seeks to describe the
functioning of argument without passing judgment on its degree of reasonableness.
Often anchored in fields such as linguistics, discourse analysis and communication
studies, descriptive approaches primarily aim to do justice to the different forms
which argumentation may take in various discourse genres and interaction contexts.
In this perspective, significant attempts have been made to bring out the
‘‘inseparability of reason and emotion’’ in a descriptive model of argumentation
based on the notions of interaction and disagreement between speakers (Plantin
1997, 1998, 1999, 2004).
The present paper is not a state-of-the-art review of how emotions are considered
in argumentation theories, although it discusses some of the most significant
contributions in the field. Its main goal is to formulate a relationship between
emotion and argumentation which differs from that usually found in most of the
literature on the subject. More precisely, I argue that there exists a ‘‘standard’’
conception of the emotion-argumentation relationship, which I do not intend to
belittle, but rather to complement with an ‘‘alternative’’ one. In the ‘‘standard’’
conception, emotions are seen as the objects of appeals and these appeals are
thought to function as external adjuvants1 to argumentation. Speakers appeal to
pity, fear, shame and the like in order to enhance the cogency of an argument which
bears on something else-whether it be the validity of a disputable opinion or the
opportunity of a suggested course of action. As I will try to demonstrate, this
conception presupposes a questionable disjunction between pathos and logos.
According to the ‘‘alternative’’ conception which I propose to consider, emotions
themselves may sometimes be seen as the very objects of argumentation : in such
cases, speakers do not so much ‘‘appeal’’ to emotions as they formulate the reasons
why they feel (or do not feel) a particular emotion and why this particular emotion
should (or should not) legitimately be felt. This alternative conception lays
emphasis on the arguability of emotions, and follows Michael Gilbert’s claim that
‘‘once we stop thinking of arguing about emotions as inherently different from
arguing about anything else, the path […] to creating models […] becomes
manageable’’ (2005, p. 50). Drawing on and trying to deepen Christian Plantin’s
pioneer work, I develop the idea that emotions can be viewed as the objects of
argumentative constructions.
I start by discussing how current psychological and philosophical theories
highlight the cognitive dimension of emotions, and how they can better our
understanding of a possible arguability of emotions (Sect. 1). I then turn to the
rhetorical tradition and propose a reassessment of the Aristotelian concept of pathos
(Sect. 2). As has been noted several times in scholarly work on Aristotle but much less
1 This word might seem somewhat unusual in this context: I simply use it in the sense of ‘‘a thing that
aids or help’’.
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often by argumentation theorists, this concept implies that insofar as they have
cognitive antecedents, emotions themselves are accessible to the argumentation
process. I then move to modern argumentation theories, (Sect. 3). and seek to bring out
how emotions are dealt with within normative frameworks. After raising several
objections against normative accounts of emotional appeals (Sects. 3.1, 3.2), I present
the hypothesis of an argumentative construction of emotions in some detail (Sect. 4).
1 The Cognitive Component of Emotions and the Possibility of Rational
Assessment
A look at contemporary psychological and philosophical approaches to emotions
reveals two prominent issues which seem relevant for argumentation theory:
scholars focus on the cognitive component of emotions and ask whether- and, if so,
how-they can be assessed in terms of rationality.
In the field of psychology, there is an increasing consensus according to which
emotions are not reducible to mere physiological phenomena. At the end of the
nineteenth century, William James, a pioneer of modern psychology, viewed
emotions as ‘‘bodily changes’’. This trend has been largely reversed, mainly under
the influence of what is known as appraisal theory (Frijda 1986; Lazarus 1984;
Scherer 1984, 1999). Obviously, psychologists do not contest that emotions are to a
certain extent physiological processes. Their point is, first, that physiological
processes should be considered as a component of emotions2 and, secondly, that this
component does not suffice to properly define the various emotion types (fear,
shame, pity and the like):3
A central tenet of appraisal theory is the claim that emotions are elicited and
differentiated on the basis of a person’s subjective evaluation (or appraisal) of
the personal significance of a situation, object or event on a number of
dimensions or criteria. (Scherer 1999, p. 637)
Appraisal theorists thus lay emphasis on the cognitive component of emotions and
insist on its explanatory power: not only does it allow to better understand what
emotions are, but it also provides tools to determine what emotions there are. As
Scherer explains, the idea is to identify the ‘‘criteria’’ involved in the evaluation
process (the novelty of the event, its intrinsic pleasantness, the probability or
uncertainty of its outcome, its agency, its being controllable or not, its compatibility
with social norms, etc.) and to pin down typical ‘‘profiles of appraisal’’ (ibid., p.
638) associated with particular emotions. To take but one example, indignation
typically requires that the criterion of agency be activated, for it seems difficult to
experience indignation without imputing the responsibility for a painful situation to
an agent.
2 Psychologists usually speak of ‘‘physiological activation’’ or ‘‘physiological arousal’’.
3 The philosopher Jon Elster shares this point of view: while admitting that ‘‘visceral arousal is an
important criterion for deciding that a state is an emotion and not a simple belief-desire complex’’, he
claims that ‘‘we cannot use fine-grained differences in arousal patterns to decide whether the organism is
experiencing envy or indignation, anger or hatred, etc.’’ (1999, p. 247).
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The relationship between emotion and cognition is also at the heart of
contemporary philosophical research and it seems correct to divide emotion
theories into two main categories: those who hold a cognitive view of emotional
phenomena, on the one hand, and those who do not, on the other.4 With regard to the
former, one can distinguish between radical and more moderate versions. According
to radical versions, emotions are essentially cognitive phenomena and can thus be
conceptually reduced to a set of beliefs and judgments concerning a state of affairs:
for instance, in Upheavals of Thought. The Intelligence of Emotions, Martha
Nussbaum (2003) claims that emotion should be defined as a particular form of
‘‘judgments of value’’ and that ‘‘non-cognitive elements’’ such as ‘‘bodily
sensations’’ are marginal in defining its core features. According to moderate
versions, emotions are multifaceted phenomena which can be characterized in terms
of several features, among which cognitive antecedents play a significant part.5 In
this respect, the idea is that whereas they should not be conceptually reduced to
beliefs or judgments, emotions generally presuppose such cognitive phenomena.
The aim of this paper is not to offer a complete overview of emotion theories, nor
to engage in a fully fledged discussion of the complex relationship between
cognition and emotion: there is much debate concerning what is meant by
‘‘cognition’’ in the case of emotions6 and cognitive theories are faced with a number
of recurrent objections.7 There is, however, an increasing acceptance among
scholars in psychology and philosophy that emotions are—at least in part—
cognitive phenomena and cannot be reduced to mere physiological reactions. My
aim is to evaluate the possible consequences of this ‘‘cognitive’’ view of emotions
for argumentation theory. (i) If they involve a process of evaluation, emotions
should not only be viewed in terms of their subsequent impact on cognition: it is not
enough to discuss the effects which emotions may have on the rationality of beliefs
and judgments. One should recognize, first, that emotions originally stem from
cognition: to a certain extent, they are rooted in cognitive evaluation. (ii) This last
statement has a major consequence, namely that ‘‘emotions themselves can be
assessed as more or less rational, independently of their impact on choice and belief
4 Tappolet follows this division in her clear and well-informed overview of emotion theories (2006, p.
365). In Les Passions (2004), Hugon-Talon distinguishes between «les the´ories jugementalistes [selon
lesquelles] les passions supposent des croyances et des jugements» and «les the´ories anti-jugementalistes
[qui] re´fe`rent les passions a` une cause exclusivement somatique» (2004, pp. 40–41).
5 In Alchemies of the Mind. Rationality and the Emotions, Elster lists seven features: (1) qualitative feel,
(2) cognitive antecedents, (3) an intentional object, (4) physiological arousal, (5) physiological
expressions, (6) valence, (7) characteristic action tendencies (1999, p. 246).
6 The problem has to do with the degree of consciousness which concepts such as ‘‘cognition’’,
‘‘evaluation’’ and ‘‘appraisal’’ imply in the case of emotions: critics argue that it is improbable that
elaborate and reflexive cognitive processes are carried out in the few milliseconds that are sometimes
sufficient to see an emotion emerge. Scherer addresses this accusation of ‘‘excessive cognitivism’’ and
specifies that ‘‘many appraisal processes may occur below the degree of consciousness’’ (1999, p. 642).
7 Most importantly, one can point to the problem of disjunction. First, an emotion may persist even if the
corresponding belief is not—or no longer—held by the subject: I may experience fear in the presence of
spiders even if I do not believe for a second that they represent any threat to my well-being. Secondly, the
presence of a belief does not necessarily entail the expected emotion: I may firmly believe that a future
event constitutes a genuine threat to my well-being without experiencing fear at all (see Ogien 2003, pp.
154–156 and Tappolet 2000, pp. 145–162 for a review of the main objections to cognitive theories).
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formation’’ (Elster 1999, p. 284, my emphasis). Argumentation theory should thus
pay attention to how speakers assess the rationality of emotions and, above all, it
should be able to describe how they justify such assessments. When they engage in
argumentation, speakers may contest the rationality of their opponent’s emotion by
attacking the beliefs and judgments in which this emotion appears to be grounded.
When their own emotion is called into question, they may verbalize the type of
evaluation which underlies it and which—in their view—confers it with a rational
basis. All in all, a ‘‘cognitive’’ view implies that emotions are accessible to
argumentation: they do not by essence fall outside its jurisdiction, so to speak. As I
will argue below, the legitimacy of an emotion can be questioned during an
interaction and in this case, speakers will sometimes give reasons which support or,
conversely, invalidate the said emotion.
2 The Arguability of Emotions in the Rhetorical Tradition
At first sight, the rhetorical tradition may not seem to be the best place to look for a
possible arguability of emotions. Indeed, the typical orator is not concerned with
putting arguments forward in order to support a given emotion, but rather with using
emotional appeals so that his arguments achieve maximal persuasion. In this
section, I argue that although it primarily views emotion as an effective adjuvant to
argumentation, rhetoric also indirectly conveys the idea that emotions themselves
are accessible to argumentation.
Let us look very briefly8 at the main features of the concept of pathos, as defined
in Aristotle’s Rhetoric9 and in the work of his Latin followers. According to
Aristotle’s famous definition, rhetoric may be defined as ‘‘an ability, in each
[particular case], to see the available means of persuasion’’ (I, 2, 1355b). The
Stagirite claims that that these ‘‘means of persuasion’’ can be divided into ‘‘three
species’’: ‘‘Some are in the character of the speaker, and some in disposing the
listener in some way, and some in the speech itself, by showing or seeming to show
something’’ (I, 2, 1356a, my emphasis). It is, as the reader will have recognized, the
famous trichotomy between ethos, pathos and logos. In its broadest sense, the term
‘‘pathos’’ has to do with the idea of change, movement or alteration. More
specifically, it denotes a state of the mind, when the latter is altered by an external
cause : in this respect, as Gise`le Mathieu-Castellani (2000, pp. 49–52) points out in
her semantic analysis of the term, latin equivalents such as motus animi
(‘‘movement of the mind’’) and perturbatio animi (‘‘perturbation of the mind’’)
are very clear. What exactly does this change consist of, and how does it help to
achieve persuasion? ‘‘Persuasion’’, as Aristotle explains, may come ‘‘through the
hearers, when they are led to feel emotion by the speech; for we do not give the
same judgment when grieved or rejoicing or when being friendly or hostile’’ (I, 2,
1356a). Here, we find one of the crucial features of pathos, namely its impact on
cognition. It is exemplified in the very definition of pathos, which the philosopher
8 For a detailed account of the concept of pathos in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, see Wisse (1989).
9 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, translated by George Kennedy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
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gives at the beginning of Book 2: ‘‘The emotions are those things through which, by
undergoing change, people come to differ on their judgments and which are
accompanied by pleasure or pain’’ (II, 2, 1378a, my emphasis). In a rhetorical
situation, the audience ultimately has to pass judgment on a given case. Through a
skillful use of pathos, the orator modifies the audience’s disposition to pass
judgment so that it favors the cause which he wants to see prevail. From such a
perspective, emotions are reputed to have effects on the audience’s cognitive
faculties: they tend to bias the formation of beliefs, the passing of judgment and the
decision-making process. Discussing effects is not enough, however, and a detailed
examination of pathos yields further results concerning the relationship between
emotion and cognition. Simply put, the point which I would like to make is the
following: rhetoric not only teaches us that emotions have cognitive effects, but also,
and crucially, that they have cognitive origins. True, the very definition of pathos
which appears at the beginning of Book 2 clearly focuses on the first side of the
issue: emotions are the source of variations of judgment. Yet this general definition
is not representative of how Aristotle describes particular emotions in the rest of
Book 2:
[This definition] is misleading […] because it defines emotions by their impact
on cognition rather than by the fact that they are shaped by cognition. When
Aristotle considers specific emotions, he consistently analyzes them in terms
of their cognitive antecedents rather than in terms of their consequences for
cognition. (Elster 1999, p. 55)
While Mathieu-Castellani is right when she asserts that rhetoric investigates the role
of the passions in the formation of judgment («le roˆle des passions dans la formation
du jugement» 2000, p. 198), one could be tempted to reverse the phrase and say that
rhetoric also investigates ‘‘the role of judgment in the formation of the passions’’.
Indeed, when Aristotle discusses a particular emotion, he systematically asks the
following questions: (i) What is the ‘‘state of mind’’ of the person who experiences
this emotion?; (ii) Who does he or she experience it about?; (iii) For ‘‘what sort of
reasons’’? (II, 2, 1356a). The second question lays emphasis on the fact that
emotions have intentional objects. The third question suggests that intentional
objects give rise to a set of beliefs and judgments which somehow justify10 the
given emotion. The Aristotelian analysis of the patheˆ basically consists in coupling
each particular emotion with a prototypical situation—or, more precisely, with a
prototypical evaluation of a situation. Let us take the example of pity (eleos):
Let pity be defined as a certain pain at an apparently destructive or painful
event happening to one who does not deserve it and which a person might
expect himself or one of his own to suffer, and this when it seems close at
hand; for it is clear that a person who is going to feel pity necessarily thinks
that some evil is actually present of the sort that he or one of his own might
suffer and that this evil is of the sort mentioned in the definition or like it or
about equal to it. (II, 8, 1385b)
10 The beliefs and judgments justify the emotion in the eyes of the person who feels it. They are, however,
open to criticism when speakers engage in argumentation—and that is what concerns me here.
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It seems clear, from this quotation, that an emotion requires what Elster calls
‘‘cognitive antecedents’’. If we follow Aristotle, in order to feel pity, one must
entertain certain beliefs and judgments. First, one must judge someone else’s
misfortune as being undeserved. Second, one must believe that such a misfortune is
not unlikely to fall on oneself or on one’s relatives. The point, here, is not to discuss
Aristotle’s definition of pity per se. It is to bring out his method of analysis, which
suggests, to use Elster’s terms, that emotions are ‘‘shaped in cognition’’: they
depend on the evaluation of a situation and rest on a set of beliefs and judgments
regarding this situation.
There are two consequences to be drawn from this concept of emotion. (i) The
first and the most obvious one is pragmatic. Rhetoric is a techneˆ which is used in
order to reach a specific goal, namely persuading an audience. In this respect, pathos
is, as we have seen, one of the three ‘‘means’’ which are ‘‘available’’ to achieve
persuasion. If he is to use pathos effectively, the orator must have an understanding
of how emotions work, so to speak: he cannot put his audience in a state of fear, say,
without a knowledge of the set of beliefs and judgments which are most commonly
associated with this particular emotion. In other words, analyzing the patheˆ in terms
of their cognitive antecedents provides the orator with tools to ‘‘dispose the listener
in some way’’ (I, 2, 1356a) and reach his persuasive goal. (ii) There is a second and
less obvious consequence which, although not directly stated by Aristotle, is
fundamental: if emotions do have cognitive antecedents, then they are not by
essence impervious to argument. While it has received little attention so far in
argumentation theory,11 this idea has been developed by some important Aristotle
scholars in the field of philosophy:
[Aristotle] describes emotions as closely bound up with judgments, and
therefore capable of being modified by a modification of judgment. This
picture implies not only that emotions can play a role in rational deliberation,
but also that they can be changed as beliefs of all sorts can be changed, by
deliberation and argument. (Nussbaum 1996, p. 318)12
By construing thought or belief as the efficient cause of emotion, Aristotle
showed that emotional response is intelligent behavior open to reasoned
persuasion. When men are angered, they are not victims of some totally
irrational force. Rather they are responding in accordance with the thought of
unjust insult. Their belief may be erroneous and their anger unreasonable, but
their behavior is intelligent and cognitive in the sense that it is grounded upon
a belief which may be criticized and even altered by argumentation.
(Fortenbaugh 2002, p. 17, my emphasis)
It could be questioned whether argument actually succeeds in ‘‘modif[ying]’’,
‘‘chang[ing]’’ or ‘‘alter[ing]’’ a given emotion: this has to do with the question of
perlocutionary effect, which is not relevant here. What is important, however, is that
emotions are open to dispute and fall within the realm of argumentation. A person
11 With the exception of Christian Plantin’s work, on which I come back in Sect. 4.
12 For a similar argument, see Elster in his chapter ‘‘Aristotle on the emotions’’: ‘‘If emotions […]
depend on beliefs, they are amenable to rational argument designed to change the belief’’ (1999, p. 56).
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can contest the validity of another person’s emotion by attacking the judgments and
the beliefs which this emotion appears to be ‘‘bound up with’’, to use Nussbaum’s
terms. In return, the other person can justify his emotion by defending the beliefs
and judgments in question. According to Stephen Leighton, it is precisely their
accessibility to argumentation which separates emotions (patheˆ) from ‘‘desires’’ or
‘‘appetites’’ (epithumia):13
[A]nother utilization of the difference between epithumia and emotion has to
do with the obedience of emotion, but not epithumia, to reason. […N]ot only
might you convince a person not to act on their emotion, say, fear, but also
might you talk the person out of it. This latter you might do by convincing
them that one of their judgments whence their fear arose was wrong […W]hile
we give grounds for emotions, we only give causes for thirst and other
epithumia. Thus the former, but not the latter, is, in this sense, conquered by
argument. Thus it is the former, but not the latter, that Aristotle concerns
himself with and explains the grounds upon which they are felt. (Leighton
1996, pp. 226–227)
Again, it remains to be seen whether argumentation is in fact effective in ‘‘talk[ing]
a person out of [his emotion]’’. The point, here, is that it is possible to retrieve the
judgments ‘‘whence [an emotion] ar[ises]’’ and to question them. In other words, it
is not necessary to go as far as to say that argumentation is able to ‘‘convince’’
someone not to feel an emotion: such a statement would raise empirical
objections—e.g. that emotions may linger in spite of the ‘‘grounds’’ which are
given against them. As I have already said, the perlocutionary issue is not of concern
here. My point is solely that emotions may become disputable matters during
interaction: their adequacy may be challenged and, consequently, speakers may put
forward claims which either seek to justify or to undermine them.14
13 This point, however, is a bit more complex than it seems. It should be added that within certain limits
‘‘desires’’ and ‘‘appetites’’, too, can become the object of argumentative discourse. The main issue would
then certainly be their resistibility (‘‘Can desires and appetites be resisted?’’, ‘‘Should desires and
appetites be resisted, and if so, how?’’, etc.). To put it simply, speakers may argue about how to properly
deal with them. The same goes for emotions, obviously, the crucial difference being that speakers may
also argue about an emotion’s intrinsic rationality or legitimacy, and thus evaluate whether or not it is
grounded on good reasons. In the case of ‘‘desires’’ and ‘‘appetites’’, an evaluation in terms of goodness of
reasons seems more difficult, if not impossible.
14 This can be illustrated by a short example of contemporary political discourse. During the last French
presidential debate (May 2, 2007), Nicolas Sarkozy was opposed to Se´gole`ne Royal. A particular episode
of the debate was largely commented by the media in the following days. During a discussion concerning
the social integration of handicapped children, Sarkozy promised that he would do everything in his
power to ‘‘give each of these children a place in the schools’’. Royal then vehemently denounced her
opponent’s ‘‘political immorality’’, because, she argued, Sarkozy himself had suppressed a series of
measures destined to help handicapped children at the time he was serving as Minister of the Interior.
Royal asserted that she was ‘‘very angry’’, while Sarkozy suggested that his opponent’s ‘‘anger’’ was
groundless and did not rest on good reasons: ‘‘I don’t know why Mrs. Royal is getting angry’’, ‘‘I don’t
understand why Mrs. Royal, who’s usually calm, has lost her temper’’ («Je ne sais pas pourquoi Madame
Royal s’e´nerve», «Je ne comprends pas pourquoi Madame Royal, d’habitude calme, a perdu ses nerfs»).
Royal then seeked to justify her emotion and to show that is was indeed grounded in reason: ‘‘Some
angers are healthy, because they correspond to people’s suffering’’ («Il y a des cole`res saines, parce
qu’elles correspondent a` la souffrance des gens»). She even went as far as to claim a disposition toward
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To sum up, rhetoric presents us with a twofold relationship between emotion,
cognition and argumentation. On the one hand, pathos functions as an adjuvant to
argumentation: if skillfully used, it helps to achieve persuasion, for it affects the
audience’s beliefs and judgments in the desired way. On the other hand, the very
concept of pathos indirectly suggests that emotions themselves are open to
argumentation, for they rest on beliefs and judgments about an intentional object.
3 Emotion in Modern Argumentation Theories: Two Perspectives
After discussing the rhetorical concept of pathos, I would like to find out whether,
and if so how, modern argumentation theories investigate the arguability of
emotions. Does the idea according to which emotions are somehow accessible to
argumentation receive any explicit attention in argumentation theory?
3.1 The Rejection of Emotional Appeals as Illegitimate Substitutes for
Argument
Normative approaches often take up a stance which sees emotional appeals as
illegitimate substitutes for argument. These two terms need some explanation: why
are emotional appeals deemed illegitimate and how exactly do they act as
substitutes? According to several argumentation theorists, emotional appeals fail to
meet what Trudy Govier calls the ‘‘relevance condition’’ (1997, pp. 73–75): they
neither count for nor against the claim which is in dispute and have no bearing on its
acceptability. As Govier explains, emotional appeals are deceiving insofar as they
put the audience under the impression that reasons have actually been given for or
against the disputable claim whereas it is not the case. However ‘‘irrelevant’’, they
are able to affect the audience’s disposition to pass judgment:15
Some poor arguments trade on emotionally charged language. […] The
substitution of emotionally charged language for argument is […] quite
common. If situations are described in emotionally negative language, we tend
to assume that something is wrong, whereas if they are described in
emotionally positive language, we tend to think everything is fine. […]
What we should be on watch for is emotionally charged language that conveys
a view on a controversial point where the point is in question and no
supporting evidence is put forward. (1997, pp. 117–118)
Footnote 14 continued
anger, thus highlighting the fact that this particular emotion is at the heart of political action: ‘‘There will
be times when I’ll be angry, even when I am President of the Republic’’ («Il y a des cole`res que j’aurai,
meˆme quand je serai Pre´sidente de la Re´publique»).
15 It should be noticed that normative argumentation theorists are often very close to rhetoricians when it
comes to describing the cognitive impact of emotional appeals. The essential difference is praxeological:
while the latter often recommend to take advantage of it in order to maximize persuasion, the former
discourage it in the name of an ideal of reasonable argumentation.
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To sum up, emotional appeals tend to short-circuit the argument proper, so to
speak, and this without the audience knowing, for they are able to mask their own
irrelevance. In the pragma-dialectical model, van Eemeren and Grootendorst
(2004, p. 192) also view emotional appeals as fallacies of relevance: they violate
one of the ten ‘‘rules of critical discussion’’, namely that ‘‘a standpoint may not be
defended by an argumentation which is not relevant to the standpoint’’.16
Categorizing emotional appeals as illegitimate substitutes for argument carries, I
will argue, two questionable assumptions. First, it presupposes that argumenta-
tion—in its most agreed-upon sense, as the act of justifying a disputable
standpoint by putting forward a set of claims which support it—and emotional
appeals are two perfectly discrete and even mutually exclusive processes: when
emotions are appealed to, we are outside the jurisdiction of argument, so to speak,
and reciprocally, when a proper argument is offered, there is not any appeal to
emotion, or rather there should not be one. Yet such a dichotomy is highly
debatable. Indeed—and this is my main point—emotional appeals may very well
be argumentative, in the sense that a speaker may put forward a set of claims
which seek to justify the legitimacy of her emotion and offer reasons why it
should be felt.17 Secondly, emotional appeals are often described as part of
‘‘irrelevant premises’’ (Govier 1997, p. 170) which sometimes achieve to impose a
conclusion for which they provide no adequate support and on which they in fact
have no bearing at all. Yet it is not always correct to presuppose that emotional
appeals are ‘‘located’’ in the premises. In some cases, we have an argument whose
conclusion states that an emotion is or should be felt, and whose premises offer
reasons why this particular emotion is or should legitimately be felt. In a
groundbreaking article which probably has not received all the attention it
deserves by argumentation scholars, Brinton (1988, p. 212) argues that appealing
to emotion might very well be ‘‘reason-giving’’: in this case, it ‘‘treats the emotion
(or the proposition that you ought to undergo the emotion) as a conclusion’’ and
gives ‘‘reasons’’ for feeling this emotion.
3.2 An Acceptance Under Conditions
Within the realm of normative approaches, Douglas Walton’s work (1992, 1997,
2000) offers the most nuanced and detailed account of emotional appeals in
16 See however Gilbert (2005) for an attempt to integrate emotions into the pragma-dialectic model.
17 It should be added here that speakers do not only offer argumentative constructions of emotions which
they claim to be feeling during the argumentative discussion. True, the two processes often go hand in
hand: speakers try to justify an emotion which, at the same time, they attribute to themselves. However, it
is possible for speakers to argue about an emotion which they do not claim to be experiencing. It is even
possible for them to argue about the general value of an emotion without allowing the experience of it or
the appeal to it in the argumentative discussion (for example, in a philosophical debate, speakers may
argue about the general value of anger in the conduct of practical reason). As will appear in Sect. 4, the
cases which interest me most are those where speakers argue for or against a particular emotion which
they attribute to themselves or to their opponents.
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argumentative discourse. It firmly rejects the negative ontology which dismisses
emotional appeals on the sole ground that they are emotional appeals and cannot
thus be anything but fallacious. Walton claims that ‘‘there is nothing wrong per se
with appeals to emotion in argumentation, even though appeals to emotion can go
wrong and be exploited in some cases’’ (1992, p. 257). It is important to notice
that Walton does not consider emotional appeals as fallacious a priori: in his
view, potential fallacies lie in contextual uses of emotional appeals, but not in
their very essence. Far from an essentialist perspective, Walton aims to sort out
the ‘‘right’’ uses of emotional appeals from the ‘‘wrong’’ ones: his contribution is
‘‘a normative analysis of the conditions under which appeals to emotion are used
correctly or incorrectly in argumentation’’ (1992, p. 28). In order to be properly
understood, this normative approach to emotional appeals is to be situated within
the more general framework of Walton’s theory of fallacies. Following the revised
version of this theory, arguments are evaluated as ‘‘reasonable’’ or ‘‘fallacious’’
according to communicative norms rather than according to universal logical
standards: Walton claims that fallacies are ‘‘technique[s] of argumentation that
may in principle be reasonable, but that ha[ve] been misused in a given case in
such a way that [they go] strongly against or hinde[r] the goals of dialogue’’
(1992, p. 18).This definition suggests that in order to pin down a fallacy, the
analyst first needs to subsume the context in which speakers are interacting under
a normative model of dialogue and then determine whether or not a given
argument is in compliance with the rules set by this model of dialogue. Walton’s
methodology rests on the assumption that each model of dialogue involves
specific goals which speakers are bound to pursue conjointly and thus claims that
an argument is reasonable insofar as it makes a contribution to these goals. How
does this pragmatic view of fallacy underpin Walton’s specific work on appeals to
emotion? Walton writes:
[E]motional arguments can be used fallaciously in particular uses so that they
go contrary to the proper goals of […] dialogue that participants are supposed
to be engaged in. Contrary to the common assumption that an argument based
on emotion is not a rational (reasonable) argument, such an argument can be
good and reasonable insofar as ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘rational’’ argument is that which
contributes to the proper goals of dialogue. (1992, pp. 25–27)
The degree of reasonableness or fallaciousness of an emotional appeal depends on
its fitting a particular model of dialogue and on its contribution to the latter’s goals.
For example, in deliberation—one of the possible models of dialogue—, ‘‘typically,
there is a decision to be made between incompatible courses of action. […T]he aim
is to decide which one is the best (or preferable) one to take in the circumstances’’
(1997, p. 115). The arguers will resort to practical reasoning, which is directed
towards a conclusion recommending a prudent course of action. According to
Walton, emotional appeals are reasonable insofar as they do not impede critical
questioning on the part of the respondent (1992, pp. 260–264). They are, however,
deemed fallacious if they prevent the respondent from asking critical questions
concerning the recommended course of action—its feasibility, its cost, its
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side-effects, its alternatives and its compatibility with other goals pursued by the
respondent.18
Despite being highly coherent and refined, Walton’s approach remains unsat-
isfactory on one point: it is overly focused on the possible effects which emotional
appeals are likely to have on the argumentative process, and not enough on the
emotional appeals’ inherent argumentative dimension. Walton’s method tries to
determine whether a given emotional appeal will have positive or negative effects,
and this with regard to the ideal progression of the argumentative process which is
normatively fixed by such and such ‘‘model of dialogue’’. If emotional appeals have
the effect of contributing to the goals of the model of dialogue which speakers are
supposed to be engaged in, they will be considered ‘‘reasonable’’. If, however, they
result in violating these goals, they will be considered ‘‘fallacious’’. This method is
coherent with Walton’s declared normative stance, which seeks to evaluate the
emotional appeals’ merits, but its focus on their effects is to the detriment of an in-
depth description of their inherent argumentative dimension.
4 An Alternative Approach: Emotions as Objects of Argumentative
Constructions
The main problem with normative approaches to emotional appeals is in my view
the following: normative approaches posit the discreteness of pathos and logos and
assume that they form two distinct parts of the argumentative process, which coexist
more than they intertwine. This assumption leads them to discard emotional appeals
when they are thought to act as illegitimate substitutes for proper argument, or to
discuss their possible effects—be they negative or, sometimes, positive—on the
‘‘good’’ course of the argumentative process (as fixed by a ‘‘model of dialogue’’).
Emotional appeals are fundamentally viewed as complements which are
‘‘grafted’’—to use one of Walton’s terms (1997, p. 120 and 122)—onto something
else which constitutes the core of argumentation (types of reasoning, argumentation
schemes and the like). In what follows, I aim to challenge such assumptions and
suggest that it is analytically fruitful to treat emotional appeals as forms of
argumentation and not merely as adjuncts to argumentation. In order to do this, I
wish to introduce a concept—namely the argumentative construction of emotions.
This concept has the advantage of grasping two types of relationships that may
occur between emotion and argumentation, and allows to contrast a ‘‘standard’’ and
an alternative conception of pathos. (i) According to the ‘‘standard’’ conception, the
construction of an emotion is called ‘‘argumentative’’ in the sense that it functions
as an adjuvant to argumentation. The adjective ‘‘argumentative’’ refers to the
extrinsic finality of the emotional appeal: in this respect, speakers appeal to
emotions in order to enhance the cogency of an argumentation which seeks to
establish the validity of an opinion or the opportunity of an action. (ii) According to
18 According to Walton, those are the five main critical questions by means of which one can oppose a
specimen of practical reasoning (1997, p. 112).
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the ‘‘alternative’’ conception which I present here, the construction of emotion can
be called ‘‘argumentative’’ in the sense that the emotion itself is the very object of
argumentation. The adjective ‘‘argumentative’’ refers to the intrinsic form and
functioning of the emotional appeal. In this respect, speakers argue in favor of or
against an emotion: they give reasons supporting why they feel (or do not feel) this
emotion and why it should (or should not) be legitimately felt. In such cases, the
argumentative process bears not so much upon dispositions to believe or to act as
upon dispositions to feel.
The arguability of emotions is a theme highlighted in Christian Plantin’s
descriptive approach to argumentation (1997, 1998 in French, 1999, 2004 in
English). Plantin does not start from the rhetorical concept of pathos and does not
seek to emphasize that it implies that emotions possess an argumentable core (as I
have attempted to do in Sect. 2). Rather, Plantin starts off with an empirical
observation: in interaction, it is not at all infrequent to see speakers question the
value and legitimacy of their addressee’s (or of someone else’s) emotions (2004, p.
268). These are cases one might label as disagreements over emotions. More
precisely, we can distinguish between three varieties of disagreement. Speakers may
call into question (i) an occurrent emotion, (ii) a long-term propensity to experience
a specific type of emotion (what Elster calls an ‘‘emotional disposition’’, 1999, p.
244) and, last but not least, (iii) an absence of emotion. Disagreements often lead to
sequences in which speakers attempt to explain why they feel what they feel and, in
a more normative way, why everyone should feel what they feel. Plantin claims that
in such cases, speakers ‘‘argue emotions’’ (1999), so to speak: they try to establish
the legitimacy of certain emotions by showing that the latter are grounded on
reasons. In other words, speakers offer argumentative constructions of their
emotions. Such a perspective, which underlines the existence of disputable emotions
and which considers the possibility that the latter can be ‘‘argued’’ by speakers, has
two main advantages. (i) It broadens the scope of the concept of argumentation.
Usually, argumentative discourse is assumed to bear on specific objects and to
pursue specific aims: it is thought to provide reasons for our disposition to entertain
certain opinions and for our disposition to act in certain ways. Following Plantin’s
hypothesis, one may point out that argumentative discourse may also provide
reasons for our disposition to feel—or not to feel—certain emotions. (ii) It provides
a fruitful alternative to the normative approaches examined above. As we have seen,
the latter seek to determine whether an appeal to emotion is ‘‘reasonable’’ or
‘‘fallacious’’: in this respect, they are primarily interested in the effects which an
appeal to emotion is likely to produce, with regard to an idealized argumentative
process. The alternative conception which I present here following Plantin does not
ponder whether an appeal to emotion will have positive or negative effects in
reference to an idealized argumentative process: its central claim is that emotional
appeals themselves are argumentative and can be studied as such. What is at stake,
then, is to examine how speakers argue emotions—that is: how speakers attempt to
establish the legitimacy (or the illegitimacy) of certain emotions.
The question, now, is how to study and objectify this process in specimens of
naturally-occurring argumentative discourse. This question can only be introduced
here, but I would like to outline a method of analysis.
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3. Legitimation or illegitimation 
of emotion
2. Evaluation of emotion
1. Attribution of emotion
The argumentative construction of 
emotions
This table seeks to represent a three-step approach. The first step is to see that
emotions are subject to a process which Fiehler (2002, p. 86) calls ‘‘thematization’’:
‘‘In thematization, […] an emotion is made the topic of the interaction by a
verbalization’’. Linguistically, thematization involves an act of reference to an
emotional state: the latter is not merely ‘‘alluded to’’ (Besnier 1990, p. 428) by
means of verbal, paraverbal or even non-verbal cues. What is fundamental is that
thematization often goes hand in hand with a process of attribution: typically, the
utterance refers to an emotional state and attributes it to an individual. This
individual may be the speaker herself, in which case it is appropriate to speak of
self-attribution. It can however also be the addressee or a third party: such cases
pertain to other-attribution. For example, during French parliamentary debates on
the abolition of the death penalty,19 anti-abolitionist MP’s regularly say to their
adversaries: ‘‘You feel pity for the culpable who undergoes his penalty’’. As far as
they are concerned, abolitionist MP’s evoke the ‘‘pain’’ and the ‘‘sorrow’’ felt by the
victims’ families, thus attributing an emotional disposition to a third party: however,
they contest that the acknowledgment of such an emotional disposition entails the
acknowledgment of the legitimacy of capital punishment.
The second step leads the analyst to realize that emotions are not only attributed
to individuals, they are also often evaluated at the same time. This dimension is not
dealt with in Plantin’s model, and needs to receive attention here. Indeed, speakers
rank the attributed emotions according to an axiology: they endow them with value
or, on the contrary, seek to downgrade their legitimacy. For instance, when
attributing a ‘‘pity for the culpable’’ to their abolitionist opponents, anti-abolitionist
MP’s speak of an ‘‘ill-placed’’, an ‘‘excessive’’ or a ‘‘wrong sensitivity’’. Such cases
pertain to what Fiehler calls ‘‘analyzing’’ and ‘‘calling into question’’ strategies:
‘‘Analyzing’’ refers to strategies by which the suitability of the manifested
emotion in terms of intensity or type is problematized; ‘‘Calling into question’’
refers to strategies by which displayed emotions are not accepted as
appropriate. (2002, p. 83)
What is particularly interesting is to identify the criteria upon which speakers rely
when they evaluate attributed emotions. Four main criteria can be distinguished.
19 The following examples are taken from the corpus of my doctoral thesis: La construction
argumentative des emotions dans les de´bats parlementaires franc¸ais sur l’abolition de la peine de mort
(1791–1981), University of Lausanne, 2008.
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First, speakers may evaluate if and how the attributed emotion fits to the individual
who is assumed to experience it (abolitionist MP’s will for example admit that it is
perfectly legitimate for the victims’ families to experience anger and a longing for
revenge against the criminal, but claim that such emotional states are unfit for
elected representatives). Secondly, they may evaluate if and how the attributed
emotion fits to its intentional object (anti-abolitionist MP’s constantly criticize a
feeling of pity which is directed towards ‘‘murderers’’). Thirdly, they may evaluate
the attributed emotion according to the action tendencies it is most likely to be
associated with (at the end of the eighteenth century, abolitionist MP’s claimed that
the ‘‘pity’’ which the public feels for the executed is associated with rebellious
action tendencies which lead to no longer respect the law). Fourthly, emotions can
be evaluated according to the normative constraints associated with the discourse
genre (Walton would say the ‘‘model of dialogue’’) in which speakers are
interacting.
The third step consists in describing how emotions may undergo a process of
legitimation (or illegitimation, for that matter) on the part of speakers. Indeed, when
an emotion is self- or other-attributed, it may be accompanied by a constellation of
propositions which seek to confer it with legitimacy (or illegitimacy). Such
propositions have speakers verbalize the type of situation which, in their view,
ensures the legitimate character of the emotion. Yet speaking of ‘‘verbalization’’
might not be accurate enough: Elster rightfully reminds us that ‘‘sometimes,
emotions are said to be triggered by events or state of affairs, […which], strictly
speaking, is misleading’’ (1999, p. 249). It is thus incorrect to say that types of
situations determine types of emotions: in fact, it would be better to say that types of
evaluation of situations determine types of emotions. From an argumentative
perspective, this implies that speakers actively construe the situation so that it
‘‘argues’’ in favor or against the emotion in question, so to speak. What should be an
interesting object of study, then, is the discursive constructs of situations and their
emotional orientation. Here, I would say, following Plantin, that argumentation
theory can benefit greatly from the development of cognitive approaches to
emotions. As we have seen in Sect. 1, appraisal theories are of great interest, insofar
as they remind us that emotions are closely related to a process of evaluation in the
course of which the individual interprets events and situations according to a set of
criteria. As Plantin’s work suggests, the cognitive criteria of evaluation which
psychologists study in great detail are useful from an argumentative discourse
analyst’s point of view. Indeed, they offer interesting cues for the study of the
discursive and emotionally-oriented constructs of events and situations. For
instance, an argumentative construction of indignation will usually involve the
‘‘agency’’ criterion (Scherer 2004, p. 141): speakers will try to show that a negative
state of affairs can be described as the effect of an action (or of an omission thereof)
which is itself imputable to a responsible agent (if no one can be held responsible, it
becomes difficult to maintain that indignation is grounded in reason20). To take one
last example from the French parliamentary debates on the abolition of the death
20 In their cognitive classification of emotions, Ortony et al. argue that indignation belongs to the class of
‘‘agent-based’’ (or ‘‘attribution-of-responsibility’’) emotions (1987).
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penalty, twentieth-century abolitionist MP’s often use the following argumentative
construction of indignation. They claim that the root cause for criminality is the
suffering endured by neglected members of society, and that this suffering is itself
caused by the inaction of political leaders, of the National Assembly and even of
‘‘society’’ as a whole. This particular construction of indignation crucially implies a
transfer of responsibility: those who commit crimes are portrayed as suffering
beings, as helpless victims of an unjust social system, while ‘‘society’’ is seen as the
real agent responsible for the existence of criminality. According to abolitionist
MP’s, indignation is justified, as the responsibility for criminality is not assigned
properly: it is concentrated on individuals who, in fact, have but a small part of it
(see Micheli 2008 for a more detailed analysis).
5 Concluding Remarks
The insistence on the arguability of emotions invites us to relativize the dichotomy
between logos and pathos. In his recently published Traite´ de Rhe´torique
Antilogique, Marc Angenot makes a strikingly similar point, without, however,
developing it further:
Ce qui cre´e proble`me dans la plupart des traite´s classiques, ce n’est pas la
pre´sentation de la rhe´torique comme technique comple´mentaire du logos et du
pathos, c’est la banale disjonction pathos/logos. Cette disjonction est scolaire.
Les plus subtils des rhe´teurs voient bien que les deux, non pas se coˆtoient,
mais se confondent, et qu’il faudrait analyser en bloc […] une logique des
sentiments ou plutoˆt, plusieurs logiques affectives. (2008, p. 63, my emphasis)
My aim, in this paper, was to show the analytical limitations raised when one
considers that there are, on the on the hand,‘‘pure’’ argument schemes which form
the core of reasoning and, on the other, emotional appeals which merely help to
enhance the latter’s persuasive effectiveness. One might be tempted to take up one
of Angenot’s (2008, p. 256) expressions and claim that it is possible to view pathos
as being ‘‘within the logos’’. I have tried to address the relationship between
emotion and argumentation without discarding emotional appeals as illegitimate
substitutes for proper argument and without attempting to evaluate their degree of
reasonableness by gauging their effects on the ‘‘good’’ course of the argumentative
process. Emotions can be seen as objects of argumentative constructions, I have
argued, which calls for the study of three main discursive operations: the attribution
of emotions, their evaluation and their legitimation by speakers. As the French
sociologist Boudon (1994, p. 45) once wrote: «Comprendre l’e´mergence d’un
sentiment moral, c’est le plus souvent reconstruire le syste`me de raisons qui le
fonde». Thus, a reconstruction of the reasons which speakers give for or against
particular emotions and an empirical description of the diverging ‘‘affective logics’’
which are found in interaction could be promising avenues for argumentation
studies.21
21 I wish to thank Galia Yanoshevski and Gregory Wicky for kindly checking my English.
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